Peer-reviewed works with DOI and abstract, discovered from MEDLINE-indexed literature. Candidates: no tier, no stated finding, not yet read.
Advocacy interventions to reduce or eliminate violence and promote the physical and psychosocial well-being of women who experience intimate partner abuse.
Background: Intimate partner abuse is common worldwide, damaging the short- and long-term physical, mental, and emotional health of survivors and children. Advocacy may contribute to reducing abuse, empowering women to improve their situation by providing informal counselling and support for safety planning and increasing access to different services. Advocacy may be a stand-alone service, accepting referrals from healthcare providers, or part of a multi-component (and possibly multi-agency) intervention provided by service staff or others.
Objectives: To assess the effects of advocacy interventions within or outside healthcare settings in women who have experienced intimate partner abuse.
Search methods: In April 2015, we searched CENTRAL, Ovid MEDLINE, EMBASE, and 10 other databases. We also searched WHO ICTRP, mRCT, and UK Clinical Research Network (UKCRN), and examined relevant websites and reference lists with forward citation tracking of included studies. For the original review we handsearched six key journals. We also contacted first authors of eligible papers and experts in the field.
Selection criteria: Randomised or quasi-randomised controlled trials comparing advocacy interventions for women with experience of intimate partner abuse versus no intervention or usual care (if advocacy was minimal and fewer than 20% of women received it).
Data collection and analysis: Two review authors independently assessed risk of bias and undertook data extraction. We contacted authors for missing information needed to calculate statistics for the review and looked for adverse events.
Main results: We included 13 trials involving 2141 participants aged 15 to 65 years, frequently having low socioeconomic status. The studies were quite heterogeneous in terms of methodology, study processes and design, including with regard to the duration of follow-up (postintervention to three years), although this was not associated with differences in effect. The studies also had considerable clinical heterogeneity in relation to staff delivering advocacy; setting (community, shelter, antenatal, healthcare); advocacy intensity (from 30 minutes to 80 hours); and abuse severity. Three trials evaluated advocacy within multi-component interventions. Eleven measured some form of abuse (eight scales), six assessed quality of life (three scales), and six measured depression (three scales). Countries and ethnic groups varied (one or more minority ethnic groups in the USA or UK, and local populations in Hong Kong and Peru). Setting was associated with intensity and duration of advocacy. Risk of bias was high in five studies, moderate in five, and low in three. The quality of evidence (considering multiple factors such as risk of bias, study size, missing data) was moderate to low for brief advocacy and very low for intensive advocacy. Incidence of abuse Physical abuseModerate quality pooled data from two healthcare studies (moderate risk of bias) and one community study (low risk of bias), all with 12-month follow-up data, showed no effect on physical abuse for brief (< 12 hours) advocacy interventions (standardised mean difference (SMD) 0.00, 95% confidence interval (CI) - 0.17 to 0.16; n = 558). One antenatal study (low risk of bias) showed an association between brief advocacy and reduced minor physical abuse at one year (mean difference (MD) change - 1.00, 95% CI - 1.82 to - 0.18; n = 110). An antenatal, multi-component study showed a greater likelihood of physical abuse ending (odds ratio (OR) 0.42, 95% CI 0.23 to 0.75) immediately after advocacy (number needed to treat (NNT) = 8); we cannot exclude impact from other components. Low to very low quality evidence from two intensive advocacy trials (12 hours plus duration) showed reduced severe physical abuse in women leaving a shelter at 24 months (OR 0.39, 95% CI 0.20 to 0.77; NNT = 8), but not at 12 or 36 months. Sexual abuseMeta-analysis of two studies (n = 239) showed no effect of advocacy on sexual abuse (SMD - 0.12, 95% CI - 0.37 to 0.14), agreeing with the change score (MD - 0.07, 95% CI - 0.30 to 0.16) from a third study and the OR (0.96, 95% CI 0.44 to 2.12) from a fourth antenatal, multi-component study. Emotional abuseOne study in antenatal care, rated at low risk of bias, showed reduced emotional abuse at ≤ 12-month follow-up (MD (change score) - 4.24, 95% CI - 6.42 to - 2.06; n = 110). Psychosocial health Quality of lifeMeta-analysis of two studies (high risk of bias) showed intensive advocacy slightly improved overall quality of life of women recruited from shelters (MD 0.23, 95% CI 0.00 to 0.46; n = 343) at 12-month follow-up, with greater improvement in perceived physical quality of life from a primary care study (high risk of bias; MD 4.90, 95% CI 0.98 to 8.82) immediately postintervention. Depression Meta-analysis of two studies in healthcare settings, one at high risk of bias and one at moderate risk, showed that fewer women developed depression (OR 0.31, 95% CI 0.15 to 0.65; n = 149; NNT = 4) with brief advocacy. One study at high risk of bias reported a slight reduction in depression in pregnant women immediately after the intervention (OR 0.51, 95% CI 0.20 to 1.29; n = 103; NNT = 8).There was no evidence that intensive advocacy reduced depression at ≤ 12-month follow-up (MD - 0.14, 95% CI - 0.33 to 0.05; 3 studies; n = 446) or at two years (SMD - 0.12, 95% CI - 0.36 to 0.12; 1 study; n = 265). Adverse effectsTwo women died, one who was murdered by her partner and one who committed suicide. No evidence links either death to study participation.
Authors' conclusions: Results suggest some benefits from advocacy. However, most studies were underpowered. Clinical and methodological heterogeneity largely precluded pooling of trials. Therefore, there is uncertainty about the magnitude of benefit, the impact of abuse severity, and the setting. Based on the evidence reviewed, intensive advocacy may improve short-term quality of life and reduce physical abuse one to two years after the intervention for women recruited from domestic violence shelters or refuges. Brief advocacy may provide small short-term mental health benefits and reduce abuse, particularly in pregnant women and for less severe abuse.
The Cochrane database of systematic reviews · meta-analysis · 114 citationsread the source →
Storebø OJ, Stoffers-Winterling JM, Völlm BA, Kongerslev MT, Mattivi JT, Jørgensen MS, Faltinsen E, Todorovac A, Sales CP, Callesen HE, Lieb K, Simonsen E. (2020)MEDLINE-indexed journal, not yet read by usThe Cochrane database of systematic reviews · systematic review Psychological therapies for people with borderline personality disorder.
Background: Over the decades, a variety of psychological interventions for borderline personality disorder (BPD) have been developed. This review updates and replaces an earlier review (Stoffers-Winterling 2012).
Objectives: To assess the beneficial and harmful effects of psychological therapies for people with BPD.
Search methods: In March 2019, we searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase, 14 other databases and four trials registers. We contacted researchers working in the field to ask for additional data from published and unpublished trials, and handsearched relevant journals. We did not restrict the search by year of publication, language or type of publication.
Selection criteria: Randomised controlled trials comparing different psychotherapeutic interventions with treatment-as-usual (TAU; which included various kinds of psychotherapy), waiting list, no treatment or active treatments in samples of all ages, in any setting, with a formal diagnosis of BPD. The primary outcomes were BPD symptom severity, self-harm, suicide-related outcomes, and psychosocial functioning. There were 11 secondary outcomes, including individual BPD symptoms, as well as attrition and adverse effects.
Data collection and analysis: At least two review authors independently selected trials, extracted data, assessed risk of bias using Cochrane's 'Risk of bias' tool and assessed the certainty of the evidence using the GRADE approach. We performed data analysis using Review Manager 5 and quantified the statistical reliability of the data using Trial Sequential Analysis.
Main results: We included 75 randomised controlled trials (4507 participants), predominantly involving females with mean ages ranging from 14.8 to 45.7 years. More than 16 different kinds of psychotherapy were included, mostly dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT) and mentalisation-based treatment (MBT). The comparator interventions included treatment-as-usual (TAU), waiting list, and other active treatments. Treatment duration ranged from one to 36 months. Psychotherapy versus TAU Psychotherapy reduced BPD symptom severity, compared to TAU; standardised mean difference (SMD) -0.52, 95% confidence interval (CI) -0.70 to -0.33; 22 trials, 1244 participants; moderate-quality evidence. This corresponds to a mean difference (MD) of -3.6 (95% CI -4.4 to -2.08) on the Zanarini Rating Scale for BPD (range 0 to 36), a clinically relevant reduction in BPD symptom severity (minimal clinical relevant difference (MIREDIF) on this scale is -3.0 points). Psychotherapy may be more effective at reducing self-harm compared to TAU (SMD -0.32, 95% CI -0.49 to -0.14; 13 trials, 616 participants; low-quality evidence), corresponding to a MD of -0.82 (95% CI -1.25 to 0.35) on the Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory Scale (range 0 to 34). The MIREDIF of -1.25 points was not reached. Suicide-related outcomes improved compared to TAU (SMD -0.34, 95% CI -0.57 to -0.11; 13 trials, 666 participants; low-quality evidence), corresponding to a MD of -0.11 (95% CI -0.19 to -0.034) on the Suicidal Attempt Self Injury Interview. The MIREDIF of -0.17 points was not reached. Compared to TAU, psychotherapy may result in an improvement in psychosocial functioning (SMD -0.45, 95% CI -0.68 to -0.22; 22 trials, 1314 participants; low-quality evidence), corresponding to a MD of -2.8 (95% CI -4.25 to -1.38), on the Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (range 0 to 100). The MIREDIF of -4.0 points was not reached. Our additional Trial Sequential Analysis on all primary outcomes reaching significance found that the required information size was reached in all cases. A subgroup analysis comparing the different types of psychotherapy compared to TAU showed no clear evidence of a difference for BPD severity and psychosocial functioning. Psychotherapy may reduce depressive symptoms compared to TAU but the evidence is very uncertain (SMD -0.39, 95% CI -0.61 to -0.17; 22 trials, 1568 participants; very low-quality evidence), corresponding to a MD of -2.45 points on the Hamilton Depression Scale (range 0 to 50). The MIREDIF of -3.0 points was not reached. BPD-specific psychotherapy did not reduce attrition compared with TAU. Adverse effects were unclear due to too few data. Psychotherapy versus waiting list or no treatment Greater improvements in BPD symptom severity (SMD -0.49, 95% CI -0.93 to -0.05; 3 trials, 161 participants), psychosocial functioning (SMD -0.56, 95% CI -1.01 to -0.11; 5 trials, 219 participants), and depression (SMD -1.28, 95% CI -2.21 to -0.34, 6 trials, 239 participants) were observed in participants receiving psychotherapy versus waiting list or no treatment (all low-quality evidence). No evidence of a difference was found for self-harm and suicide-related outcomes. Individual treatment approaches DBT and MBT have the highest numbers of primary trials, with DBT as subject of one-third of all included trials, followed by MBT with seven RCTs. Compared to TAU, DBT was more effective at reducing BPD severity (SMD -0.60, 95% CI -1.05 to -0.14; 3 trials, 149 participants), self-harm (SMD -0.28, 95% CI -0.48 to -0.07; 7 trials, 376 participants) and improving psychosocial functioning (SMD -0.36, 95% CI -0.69 to -0.03; 6 trials, 225 participants). MBT appears to be more effective than TAU at reducing self-harm (RR 0.62, 95% CI 0.49 to 0.80; 3 trials, 252 participants), suicidality (RR 0.10, 95% CI 0.04, 0.30, 3 trials, 218 participants) and depression (SMD -0.58, 95% CI -1.22 to 0.05, 4 trials, 333 participants). All findings are based on low-quality evidence. For secondary outcomes see review text.
Authors' conclusions: Our assessments showed beneficial effects on all primary outcomes in favour of BPD-tailored psychotherapy compared with TAU. However, only the outcome of BPD severity reached the MIREDIF-defined cut-off for a clinically meaningful improvement. Subgroup analyses found no evidence of a difference in effect estimates between the different types of therapies (compared to TAU) . The pooled analysis of psychotherapy versus waiting list or no treatment found significant improvement on BPD severity, psychosocial functioning and depression at end of treatment, but these findings were based on low-quality evidence, and the true magnitude of these effects is uncertain. No clear evidence of difference was found for self-harm and suicide-related outcomes. However, compared to TAU, we observed effects in favour of DBT for BPD severity, self-harm and psychosocial functioning and, for MBT, on self-harm and suicidality at end of treatment, but these were all based on low-quality evidence. Therefore, we are unsure whether these effects would alter with the addition of more data.
The Cochrane database of systematic reviews · systematic review · 224 citationsread the source →
The pleasure of art as a matter of fact
You have accessMoreSectionsView PDF ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail Cite this article Nadal Marcos and Skov Martin 2018The pleasure of art as a matter of factProc. R. Soc. B.2852017225220172252http://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.2252SectionYou have accessCommentThe pleasure of art as a matter of fact Marcos Nadal Marcos Nadal http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9341-4688 Department of Psychology, University of the Balearic Islands, Palma de Mallorca 07122, Spain [email protected] Google Scholar Find this author on PubMed Search for more papers by this author and Martin Skov Martin Skov Danish Research Centre for Magnetic Resonance, Copenhagen University Hospital Hvidovre, Copenhagen 2650, Denmark Center for Decision Neuroscience, Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen 2000, Denmark Google Scholar Find this author on PubMed Search for more papers by this author Marcos Nadal Marcos Nadal http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9341-4688 Department of Psychology, University of the Balearic Islands, Palma de Mallorca 07122, Spain [email protected] Google Scholar Find this author on PubMed and Martin Skov Martin Skov Danish Research Centre for Magnetic Resonance, Copenhagen University Hospital Hvidovre, Copenhagen 2650, Denmark Center for Decision Neuroscience, Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen 2000, Denmark Google Scholar Find this author on PubMed Published:21 March 2018https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.2252All other forms of perception divide a man, because they are exclusively based either on the sensuous or on the intellectual part of his being; only the perception of the Beautiful makes something whole of him, because both his natures must accord with it.— Schiller, 1793–1795, Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, p. 138, Letter 27Can art make us better people? Better members of society? In her recent article, 'Pleasure junkies all around! Why it matters and why "the arts" might be the answer: a biopsychological perspective', Christensen [1] claims that engaging with art can promote healthy choices, choices that balance short-term pleasure goals with long-term general well-being. She suggests that many modern life conveniences, such as social media, computer games or online shopping, have the potential to turn us into 'pleasure junkies' because they maximize short-term pleasures. But art, Christensen argues, is a safe choice and a means to remedy this unhealthy addiction to pleasure. Christensen's argument is grounded on three claims about the sort of pleasure we get from art. First, in contrast to low-level pleasure, which Christensen conceives as 'a mere perceptual stimulation leading to a rewarding sensation (food, sex, etc.)' ([1], p. 2), pleasure from art is presented as a kind of higher-order pleasure that engages 'broader neural networks implied in the attribution of meaning' (p. 2), presumably leading to 'long-term maintenance of healthy bodily function' (p. 2). Second, 'the arts do not induce states of craving without fulfilment—as do activities with reinforcement schedules which are prone to create habits and addictions such as intermittent variable ratio or interval reinforcement schedules (e.g. social media, gambling, football, extreme sports, drugs' (p. 4). Third, 'the arts do not search for a perceptual "Bliss point" […]. They do not just repeat over and over again a sensory stimulus that excites the senses and induces craving for more of a "pleasurable itch" (e.g. sugar, sexualized body displays, certain musical lyrics, tones; i.e. a perceptual "bliss point")' (p. 4).The claim, in a nutshell, is that the pleasure induced by art is different to the pleasure induced by food, sex, sports or drugs, because it is related to the balanced activation of brain systems related to short-term pleasure and long-term wellbeing goals, because it does not induce craving, and because it is not aimed at a perceptual 'bliss point'. This distinct sort of pleasure, according to Christensen, makes it possible for the arts to thwart the pernicious effects that the unhealthy urges and cravings licensed by 'today's mainstream acceptance of pleasure-seeking behaviour' (p. 5) have on individuals' lives and on societies. Such sweeping statements about art, food, sex, sports and society as a whole merit close examination. Christensen's primary claim that the pleasure induced by art is of a special kind, different to the pleasure induced by other activities is not supported by current understanding of what pleasure is. It is, moreover, contradicted by abundant empirical evidence. This evidence shows that pleasures, whatever their source, owe to activity in the same mesocorticolimbic circuit [2] and are encoded as a common neural currency [3]. As Kent Berridge and Morten Kringelbach put it: 'the brain mechanisms involved in fundamental pleasures (food and sexual pleasures) overlap with those for higher-order pleasures (e.g. monetary, artistic, musical, altruistic and transcendent pleasures) […] From sensory pleasures and drugs of abuse […] to monetary, aesthetic and musical delights, all pleasures seem to involve the same hedonic brain systems' ([4], p. 481). Thus, there is no evidence for specific brain regions or neural circuits related to the pleasure from art. Rather, the appreciation of art relies on brain mechanisms that evolved to appraise the value of biologically relevant objects in relation to internal homeostatic states [5]: 'Emotional reactions to music, further, activate the same cortical, subcortical and autonomic circuits, which are considered as the essential survival circuits of biological organisms in general' ([6], p. 6). In sum, the evidence shows that pleasure elicited by music and other art forms is no different in genesis and function to the pleasure induced by food, drugs and sex [7,8]. This is a matter of fact, not opinion. What supports Christensen's argument if not empirical evidence? In our view, her argument for the distinctness of art-induced pleasure seems based upon an oversimplified and devaluing conception of the pleasures of sex, food and sports, and a very narrow notion of art and its function. Christensen presents food, sex and sports as meaningless low-level sources of pleasure, and the arts as privileged vehicles for meaningful experiences. It is the personal and meaningful engagement with art—Christensen suggests—that fosters a balanced activation of brain systems related to short-term pleasure and long-term well-being goals. However, rarely—if ever—are food, sex and sports meaningless rewarding sensations. Contrary to Christensen's definition on page 2 of her article, pleasure—even sensory pleasure—is not simply reward, and never simply a sensation [4]. Indulging in food, sex or sports are meaningful and personally significant experiences that are not a matter of mere physical sensation. The experience of pleasure from food and sex is shaped by context, knowledge, expectations, anticipations, attitudes and beliefs that bring meaning to them [9–11]. Sex can be meaningful because it signifies physical connection with one's loved one, because it is cheating on someone, or deemed a sin. Likewise, eating is not about obtaining low-level pleasure. What we eat, the way we eat, what we believe about what we eat, where and whom we eat with, imbue eating with individual and social meaning, and shape the actual pleasure of eating [12]. On the other hand, encounters with art are not necessarily meaningful [13,14]. Actually, there is nothing intrinsically meaningful about engaging with art. Many laypeople lack the knowledge schemata required to engage meaningfully with abstract, cubist or contemporary art [15,16]. There are plenty of artworks people do not find meaningful or pleasant. Meaning making is not a special feature of art; it is a general feature of our species's cognition [17,18]. We can endow virtually any aspect of reality with meaning: sex, food, sports, a urinal, the shape of a cloud, an averted glance, someone's absence. Christensen's argument also rests on a historically and culturally narrow conception of art and its function. Art is presented as a circumscribed category of activities that elicit a unique sort of pleasant experiences: — The arts are set of activities of a special kind that share certain defining features distinguishing them from other activities: 'the arts push boundaries, surprise, reveal and excite both artist and spectator' ([1], p. 4).— Art encounters are positive, leading to 'pleasurable chills' and pleasurable experiences of understanding: 'The moment of meaning-assignation, also called "mastering" or "understanding" an artwork, is therefore a pleasurable experience' ([1], p. 4).— The pleasure elicited by art is special, because it does not involve craving for intense peaks: 'The arts do not search for a perceptual "bliss point" […] They do not just repeat over and over a sensory stimulus that excites the senses and induces craving for more of a "pleasurable itch"' ([1], p. 4).This characterization of the arts substantially overlaps with the notion of 'fine arts'. The core features of this characterization were instituted in the eighteenth century, after European intellectuals grouped certain activities into a distinct and autonomous collection, labelled 'fine arts'. To make sense of and promote this grouping, it became imperative to identify a common essence setting art apart from other activities [19,20,21]. One of the most popular proposals was that only art could produce a special sort of pleasure, sophisticated and polite [19,21]—a conception stemming not from any understanding of physiology, but from mere speculation. This limited historical and cultural scope renders this conception of the arts unfit for behavioural or neuroscientific research [19]. The category 'the arts' should not be mistaken for a natural kind. It is a historical convention, and has no direct biological correspondence. Moreover, this conception of art that Christensen espouses does not apply to art as practised in non-Western societies [19,22]. It does not even apply to Western art before the eighteenth century or after the nineteenth century [19,20,21]. First, art does not necessarily evoke pleasurable experiences. There are abundant artworks intended to arouse negative emotions [19,23], and to portray physical and moral ugliness [24]. Understanding art is not necessarily a pleasant experience: it can be an angering, disgusting or upsetting one [25]. Second, many artworks actually exploit repetition, bliss points and craving [26]. Repetition is a fundamental design feature of music and other performance arts [27]: In Relation in Space (1976) Marina Abramovic and Ulay ran into each other repeatedly for an hour; Ravel's Bolero is a 17 min-long instance of melodic and rhythmic repetitiveness. Anticipation and craving for bliss points are also essential to music [28]. In fact, the enjoyment of music is linked to intense feelings of anticipation and expectation caused by dopamine activity in the caudate nucleus (also involved in the rewarding aspect of food) [29,30], and peak pleasure states (bliss points) [31], caused by the release of dopamine and opioids in the brain's reward system (also involved in cocaine induced euphoria) [29,30]. Given the available evidence, therefore, there is no reason to believe that the pleasure from art is special or unique [32].In sum, Christensen's claim for the distinctiveness of pleasure from art is contradicted by empirical evidence, and her argument for the beneficial effects of art rests upon disputed foundations. Art's capacity to promote healthier choices and make us better people that can contribute to a better society remains as unconfirmed today as it was when Schiller speculated on art's power to harmonize human's conflicting sensuous and formal impulses. Christensen's argument is problematic even if intended to highlight hypothetical possibilities. Arguments about hypothetical possibilities should still rely on valid premises, and scientific hypotheses should be grounded on evidence, or at least in line with it. Otherwise, they are merely unfounded speculations. Scientific aesthetics is only just finding its footing and its place within cognitive neuroscience [33,34]. If evidence is ignored or rejected because it does not fit preconceived notions about art and its function, scientific aesthetics will become only an arena to promote and legitimize personally appealing notions of art by applying a scientific gloss over them. A proper scientific study of art needs to be grounded on empirical evidence and strong arguments that follow from solid premises [35,36]. 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